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Early in The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith attributes the division of 
labour to “a certain propensity in human nature … the propensity to truck, barter, 
and exchange one thing for another.” In the then-new commercial port of Halifax, 
where such exchanges were based on credit rather than barter and where little 
else bound its small, fluctuating population together, the propensity to dispute 
the terms of those credit relations was a powerful corollary. The law offered the 
principal arena to adjudicate those disputes and allocated opportunities and costs 
across various litigation strategies. Economic exchange, then, was structured by 
the law. 
As James Muir notes in this refreshingly empirical study, “civil litigation was 
… a continuation of market transactions in another forum” (p. 126). To reveal 
patterns in that litigation, Muir has delved deeply into the extensive records of 
the civil courts of Halifax from the port’s founding in 1749 to 1766, a decade 
before Smith published his treatise. If Smith emphasized how widespread the 
advantages from the division of labour were, Muir stresses the unequal distribution 
of advantages from courts that favoured creditors over debtors and merchants 
and traders over others. Like Smith, however, Muir is primarily interested in the 
strategic decisions that diverse individuals made in pursuit of their own interests.
Muir thus joins other legal historians in shifting attention from the criminal 
to the civil law, and from the ‘high law’ of appellant jurisdictions, professional 
jurists, and legal doctrine to the ‘low law’ of everyday dispute-resolution by legal 
amateurs such as justices of the peace, jurors, and arbitrators. In early Halifax 
as elsewhere, civil and low law meant debt collection, the subject of more than 
three-quarters of the actions before the Inferior Court of Common Pleas. What 
choices did the law offer litigants, who were those litigants, and what choices did 
they actually make? It’s a herculean research agenda, which Muir ably fulfils by 
systematically mining the surviving minute books and case files of all five civil 
courts to create a database of more than 2,500 cases. Some readers may find the 
resulting level of detail daunting, but legal historians are much in Muir’s debt for 
his clear and comprehensive exposition of the constituent elements of civil actions 
and for mapping precisely how the law worked in practice.
Yet Muir is right to insist that this is also social history. It is concerned not with 
legal principles and specifics but with how litigants, jurors, and arbitrators acted in 
their own and their neighbours’ disputes. Indeed, social explanation often trumps 
legal analysis, as when Muir attributes the differential treatment of different types 
of debt (by note, on account, or for wages) to the livelihood of the plaintiffs most 
likely to be owed each type. This is undoubtedly part of the answer, but so too is 
the English law’s entrenched preference for written forms of evidence in contract 
and property transactions. 
Reminiscent of an older social history typified by the work of Michael Katz 
on Hamilton and David Gagan on Peel, Muir’s book serves as a reminder of the 
promise of the quantitative analysis of routinely generated records to uncover the 
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behaviour of the wider population, here divided predominantly into commercial 
and craft occupations. Muir then compares his findings to those of similar studies 
of other times and places. Based on these comparisons, he emphasizes Halifax’s 
typicality over its specificity. The question is more who and what than why. Meaning 
is inferred from observed behaviour and takes the form of possible explanations for 
patterns that emerge from the quantitative data. All this is thoughtfully done, but 
meaning in the cultural-history sense of the law’s legitimizing symbols, rhetoric, 
and rituals or in what people said or thought they were doing makes only fleeting 
appearances. This reflects the sources available, but also the methodological 
choices made. What might a historian making different choices have done 
with the more than four hundred occupational identifiers opponents ascribed to 
individuals? Muir is transparent about his own decisions and the assumptions that 
underpin them, inviting us to think anew about the promises and risks of this 
sort of social history: its methodological rigour, interpretive modesty, attention 
to detail, and respect for the agency of otherwise-invisible people, but also how 
some of its hard-won results might prove not especially surprising or significant 
and its behaviouralist allergy to politics and culture.
But what was the cumulative effect of all these individual decisions about 
litigation? The rather misleading nod in the title to “merchant power” and 
discussion of a “bourgeois system” or the law’s “buttressing of bourgeois power” 
(pp. 8, 12) in the introduction and conclusion point to one answer. The analytical 
limits of these concepts are evident from how much of the book functions without 
reference to them. Certainly, the law sought to encourage the satisfaction of 
private obligations and, as Muir shows, favoured creditor-plaintiffs when debtor-
defendants failed to meet those obligations. Naturally, it was used more often 
by those who extended more credit to more people. Distinguishing degrees of 
debtor protection rather than emphasizing the relative typicality of Halifax courts 
in aiding the enforcement of voluntary agreements might have paid dividends. 
Compare early Halifax to Upper Canada a few decades later, where more rigid legal 
formalities governed actions for all but the smallest debts, where imprisonment 
for debt appears to have been more rigorous, and where no equity of redemption 
existed to allow defaulters to regain property sold to satisfy their debts. Calling 
both ‘bourgeois’ gets us only so far.
More interesting are echoes, especially in the conclusion, of Douglas Hay’s 
argument about how the eighteenth-century criminal law legitimated unequal 
property relations in England, in part, by being constrained by its own claims to 
uphold equal justice and by being open in limited ways to the interests of the less-
propertied. Eighteenth-century civil (and property) law seems especially fertile 
ground for exploring a similar argument about the acceptance (or at least use) of 
a legal system by those whom scholars such as Hay and Muir believe were ill-
served by it. Other sources and more cultural analysis would be necessary to flesh 
out the argument fully, but Muir does show that merchants and traders appeared 
before the courts as debtors (not just creditors) and had their property, including 
slaves, sold at public auction to meet demands against them. Defendants might 
find opportunities in the law to mitigate or even defeat the more dubious and 
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vexatious demands of their creditors. Finally, more marginal occupational groups 
participated in the legal process (yeomen were more likely to serve as jurors 
than were merchants, for instance), turned to the law to secure the credit they too 
extended to others, and relied on the law’s promise to aid creditors to secure vital 
credit for themselves. Perhaps they also believed that promises ought to be kept.
Muir offers us a close reading of the largely routine workings of the civil law 
by mostly forgotten Haligonians. They had a propensity to exchange “one thing 
for another” but also to make the law their own in order to enforce, contest, and 
renegotiate their relationships. If those disputes were not always adjudicated on a 
neutral field by their peers, neither were resolutions imposed by distant authority.
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Depuis quelques années, nous assistons à une reprise intéressante d’une histoire 
« par en bas » qui reprend un langage et des thèmes plutôt chers à l’historiographie 
des années 1970 et 1980. En France par exemple, après la réédition en 2012 de son 
ouvrage majeur, La formation de la classe ouvrière anglaise (« Points », Seuil), 
un consortium d’éditeurs (EHESS, Gallimard, Seuil) a traduit en 2015 le volume 
d’essais d’Edward P. Thompson paru en anglais en 1991. En 2016, les éditions 
La Découverte ont publié le livre de Michelle Zancarini Fournel, « Les luttes et 
les rêves ». Une histoire populaire de la France de 1685 à nos jours ; et on attend 
dans le courant de 2017 un livre qui devrait également faire référence à l’histoire 
populaire dans son titre, de la part de Gérard Noiriel. Le volume de William A. 
Pelz s’inscrit dans ce mouvement, animé par des historien.nes militant.es qui ne 
font pas mystère de leurs affections politiques et de leurs filiations intellectuelles. 
L’auteur se propose de fournir aux lecteurs une vision de l’histoire européenne 
alternative à celle produite par la plupart des manuels et des synthèses existants. 
Alternative du point de vue de la chronologie retenue – du Moyen-Âge et de son 
écroulement jusqu’au seuil du XXIe siècle – et du point de vue de la perspective, 
puisqu’il s’agit de souligner le rôle du common people dans les processus 
historiques. La citation du célèbre poème de Brecht, « Questions que se pose un 
ouvrier qui lit », accompagne la présentation de la perspective choisie et souligne 
la volonté de l’auteur de raconter une histoire nécessaire, celle des travailleurs 
(working people). L’introduction signale les difficultés d’une telle histoire et les 
biais susceptibles d’affecter la reconstruction de toute histoire : la présence des 
sources, leur accessibilité et la sélection opérée par l’historien.ne, naturellement, 
mais aussi les biais relevant des options intellectuelles et idéologiques des 
auteur.es : la classe, le genre et la race, l’idéologie elle-même et une approche 
dominée par la conscience des résultats de l’histoire sur la longue période. C’est 
